As previously reported, the LRA released 28 women and children in Digba, DR Congo on March 21, 2013. According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, the group of 8 women, 13 girls, and 7 boys is the largest group to escape LRA captivity in more than three years.

So, what happened next? In this case MONUSCO DDR/RR (the UN office responsible for assisting LRA combatants and non-combatants to leave the group and return home) acted on information from Invisible Children’s Early Warning Radio Network to facilitate the transport of the women and children from Ango to Dungu. Some of the children have already been connected with UNICEF, who will reunite them with their families.

One of the women reported that prior to their release the group heard Invisible Children’s defection messaging – both through helicopter speakers and FM radio messages. They also reported seeing defection fliers. Invisible Children works with partners on the ground to encourage and facilitate the peaceful surrender of LRA combatants through defection programs and “Come Home” messaging. We believe these initiatives are some of the most effective ways to reduce threats to communities in central Africa and weaken the LRA’s ability to effectively operate. This recent defection solidifies that belief.

For those who have spent years, months, or even hours as a captive of the LRA, coming out of the bush and returning home can be extremely challenging. That’s why, three years ago, Invisible Children met with local leaders on the ground, including Abbe Benoit Kinalegu, to discuss long-term recovery solutions for LRA-affected regions like northeastern DR Congo. As a result of those conversations Invisible Children opened Centre Elikya, a rehabilitation center built specifically for children who have suffered trauma at the hands of the LRA – like the children who were just released on March 21st.

The center, which can accommodate 150 children, was opened at full capacity this year. It focuses on preparing children for successful reintegration into society through trauma counseling, and equipping children to return to school, or, if beyond school age, learning a marketable skill to be used in the workplace.

The overarching goal of Invisible Children is to assist those affected by the LRA by responding to their expressed needs. In addition to the rehabilitation center, Invisible Children Uganda has recovery programs that focus on livelihood, education, skill training, literacy courses, and counseling to aid in restoring and rehabilitating individuals and their communities. Together, we are seeing the promise of better things to come.

Learn more about Center Elikya

Donate

According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, this is the single largest return of long-term LRA members in over three years.

The LRA Crisis Tracker reports that, on March 21, 2013, four LRA soldiers escorted 28 captives to Digba, DR Congo, in order to release them. The group consisted of 28 women and children. After reaching Digba, the group traveled to Ango. One woman reportedly drowned on the journey (the LRA Crisis Tracker has not received any additional information about how the accident occurred). The remaining 27 arrived safely in Ango.

Most of the survivors were Congolese, others were Ugandan, Sudanese, and Central African. The LRA likely released the women and children in order to trim the group down to essential fighters who aren’t faced with the constraints of taking care of women and children. This is likely both a mobility and survival tactic — easier to travel between groups, fewer mouths to feed. The breakdown of women and children who were released last week:

» 8 women (18+)
» 13 girls (0-17)
» 7 boys (all 3 years or younger)

The recent escapees made it clear that, still, “There are many women and children in the bush.”

The report was called in by a community that is part of Invisible Children’s Early Warning Radio Network. The Early Warning Radio Network currently supports HF radio communication among 37 communities in central Africa that are vulnerable to LRA attacks.

Donate // Support the Early Warning Radio Network

Could upheaval in CAR spell the end for operations against the LRA?

A violent change of government that took place in the Central African Republic over the weekend could lead to the withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces working to track down LRA groups in the eastern part of the country. The departure of Ugandan and US forces from CAR, which are operating there under an authorization from the African Union and with permission from the previous CAR government, would create a security vacuum in LRA-affected areas and allow the reversal of significant gains made against the LRA in recent years.

The “Seleka” coalition, as it is known, seized control of the capital city of Bangui on Sunday. One of the rebel leaders, Michel Djotodia (profiled here), has claimed the Presidency while deposed President Francoise Bozize has fled to Cameroon. Seleka is a combination of five different CAR rebel groups that emerged in December of 2012 with claims that the central government had not delivered on promises made in previous peace agreements.

Seleka representatives previously called for the exit of all “foreign forces” from CAR. While they are likely focused most on the Chadian, South African, and other forces from neighboring countries that deployed in a (failed) effort to protect the former regime, there are indications they may ask Ugandan and US forces, which operate only with permission from the central government, to leave as well. A senior Seleka leader recently called publicly for the Ugandans to leave, though Ugandan and US government sources indicated to us that no formal request for their departure has been made since Seleka seized power.

The Ugandans have pursued the LRA in CAR, with some success, since 2009. In 2011, the African Union provided a political mandate for regional operations against the LRA and the US sent military advisors to support the Ugandan-led efforts. During this time, LRA attacks, killings, and abductions of civilians have declined significantly, and defections from LRA ranks have surged.

The withdrawal of Ugandan and US forces now – or any time before Joseph Kony is captured and the group’s command structure fully dismantled – could reverse these gains. The Ugandan-led military operations have weakened the LRA and prevented them from being able to integrate many of the civilians they abduct into their ranks. Without military pressure, Kony could rebuild much of the capacity that the LRA has lost over the past several years. And with no alternative forces that can pursue the LRA or provide protection, civilians in LRA-affected areas – who have largely welcomed the Ugandan and US deployments – would be left more exposed to LRA attacks.

One of Seleka’s member groups, the UFDR, itself clashed with the LRA back in 2010, and a field interview we conducted with a UFDR representative in 2011 suggested they view the LRA with extreme hostility. However, the UFDR may have received some support for its rebellion from the Government of Sudan (as many civil society leaders in eastern CAR believe and this 2007 HRW report alleges), which has an interest in seeing its longtime enemy Uganda depart from its backyard in CAR. In 2010, disputes between Ugandan and UFDR forces over control of diamond mines in the town of Sam Ouandja (Ugandan forces were allegedly preventing the UFDR from exploiting the illegal diamond trade, though this is disputed) also led to the Ugandans being forced to leave that town.

All this to say: there is cause for concern that the political upheaval in CAR could deal a devastating setback for international efforts to end LRA atrocities. In the short term, there is no alternative to the Ugandan-led, US-supported operations that could realistically hope to address the LRA’s threat to civilians. As international leaders engage with the newly installed CAR government to help reestablish some semblance of security and democratic governance in the country, they should urge cooperation with the African Union-authorized regional counter-LRA mission and allow Ugandan and US forces to stay put.

- Michael

Get more information on The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative via their website or follow them on Twitter @weareresolved

Garamba National Park

The recently published LRA Crisis Tracker 2012 Annual Security Brief highlights the past 12 months of LRA activity. Included in the comprehensive analysis is the alleged LRA involvement in illegal ivory trade based on reports from numerous escapees. Officials in Congo’s Garamba National Park believe the LRA is deeply engaged in the illegal trade, with the groups’ presumed location making their participation even more likely.

Yesterday Uganda’s army reported that they recovered a cache of elephant tusks that it says was hidden by the LRA in the jungles of the Central African Republic. In a statement the army said that a squad of soldiers that is part of a mission hunting rebel leader Joseph Kony found the small stash of ivory following a tip-off from an LRA defector.

“These tusks, believed to have been hidden by the LRA, were located in a remote area of the bush to the north of Djema,” the statement said, referring to a town in the southeast of the Central African Republic.

In the statement the Ugandan army said that U.S. military representatives had “secured, documented and photographed” the tusks and that it was now in contact with Central African authorities to dispose of the ivory.

Seized ivory tusks are displayed at a Hong Kong customs press conference on Jan 4, 2013

In a New York Times article published in September 2012, it was reported that “some of Africa’s most notorious armed groups [including the Lord’s Resistance Army] are hunting down elephants and using the tusks to buy weapons and sustain their mayhem. Organized crime syndicates are linking up with them to move the ivory around the world, exploiting turbulent states, porous borders and corrupt officials from sub-Saharan Africa to China.”

A ranger at Garamba National Park arranges a collection of elephant tusks

With the increasing reports from the past year about the LRA’s involvement in the poaching of elephants, the threat of LRA violence now spans beyond innocent civilians. It’s another heartwrenching reality of the cruelty of the LRA, and another steadfast reason that their atrocities need to come to an end sooner rather than later.

(Photo credits: LRA Crisis Tracker, New York Times, AFP)

The LRA Crisis Tracker, a joint project of Invisible Children and Resolve, just released its 2012 Annual Security Brief (PDF).

The Brief provides the most comprehensive analysis of recent LRA activity publicly available, giving field workers, policymakers, and activists a tool to better understand the LRA conflict. Using data collected by Invisible Children’s Early Warning Network, local communities, and organizations working in the region, Invisible Children and The Resolve- LRA Crisis Initiative analyzed thousands of pieces of data collected over the past twelve months. The brief addresses how LRA activity is changing as a result of Ugandan and American military operations and humanitarian efforts to help LRA abductees and fighters peacefully surrender. In particular, the report highlights the increasing number of Ugandan LRA fighters who are surrendering, the effectiveness of the counter-LRA strategy, and why LRA groups are abducting large numbers of people while reducing brutal massacres.

Below we highlight a couple of trends and conclusions of LRA activity from the past 12 months.

LRA violence spiked in the first half of 2012 and then tapered off in the second half of the year

243 abductions (47%) occurred between February and April, including 120 in March alone

There was an 8% reduction in LRA attacks from 2011 (299 attacks) to 2012 (275 attacks)

The number of Ugandan adult males returning from the LRA increased in 2012

Of the 20 who returned in 2012, 15 witnessed defection messaging in the form of either leaflets, FM or shortwave radio broadcasts, or helicopter-mounted speakers

11 Ugandans and 12 non-Ugandan members of the LRA defected to Safe Reporting Sites in CAR in 2012

The majority of LRA abductions in 2012 were adults used as temporary porters, not children trained to become future fighters

Over 64% of abductees escaped or were released within one month of their abduction

Children have comprised 31% of all abductees for whom age and gender information was recorded

Civilians at escalated risk of attack in early 2013

There has been a spike in LRA attacks during the first several months of each of the past three years

LRA combatants perpetrated 275 attacks against civilians in 2012

There were 51 known deaths

The Brief in its entirety is available [HERE] with the French version available [HERE]

To stay up-to-date on LRA activity visit LRACrisisTracker.com or follow them on Twitter @CrisisTracker

From Invisible Children CEO Ben Keesey:

“Today, the world learned that another top LRA commander, Vincent Binani Okumu was tracked, located and killed during a confrontation with the Ugandan military. Binani was known as one of Kony’s most brutal commanders who oversaw massacres and directed LRA forces in the abduction and killing of innocent civilians. Up until Friday he had been – and would have continued – murdering, raping, and abducting innocent people. While we do not celebrate the death of any individual, we celebrate that he can no longer commit such atrocities.”

As we reported earlier today, Lt. Col. Vincent Okumu Binanso, aka Binani, was killed by Ugandan military forces this past Friday in the northeastern corner of the Central African Republic. Although young, Binani was one of Joseph Kony’s top 10 commanders. His death comes just eight months after the capture of Maj. General Caesar Achellam, another of Kony’s top commanders.

This weekend’s events deal a significant blow to LRA operations in DR Congo and weaken its ability to carry out attacks in and around Garamba National Park, a historically-significant base for LRA operations in DR Congo. We wish that Binani had been captured, not killed, but we are glad that he is no longer able to inflict death and violence on innocent people in central Africa.

What we know:

• Binani was in charge of LRA operations in DR Congo

Binani was promoted into the command of LRA groups in DR Congo sometime between 2009 and 2010. He oversaw the brutal establishment of the group in northeastern DR Congo, which became the epicenter of LRA attacks in central Africa. Under his command the frequency and severity of LRA attacks in the country was the highest in the region. According to interviews in the field with community members and former LRA fighters, Binani had a reputation for being especially brutal in his attacks against civilians and even towards the troops under his command. According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, the LRA committed 776 attacks resulting in 630 civilian deaths and 1,264 abductions in DR Congo between 2010 and 2012.

• He oversaw the Makombo Massacres

Under the command of Binani, the LRA killed 321 civilians and abducted an additional 250 over the course of four days in December of 2009. The attack was one of the deadliest in LRA history and included gruesome tactics. A 2010 Human Rights Watch report detailed the attack: “The vast majority of those killed were adult men, whom LRA combatants first tied up and then hacked to death with machetes or crushed their skulls with axes and heavy wooden sticks. The dead include at least 13 women and 23 children, the youngest a 3-year-old girl who was burned to death. LRA combatants tied some of the victims to trees before crushing their skulls with axes.”

• Binani is from Uganda

The LRA is a top-heavy organization, and all of its officers are Ugandan. Because no non-Ugandans have been elevated within the group, each Ugandan commander removed from the battlefield greatly reduces the LRA’s capacity for violence.

• Binani was a young, up-and-coming commander

Kony has been promoting younger LRA officers over older ones, presumably because he is more confident in the young officers’ loyalty. Binani was reportedly promoted to the command of LRA groups in DR Congo in the midst of a falling out between Kony and ICC-indicted Brigadier General Dominic Ongwen.

• What Invisible Children is doing now

In the upcoming weeks and months, LRA fighters and commanders will be far more likely to surrender–especially the men and women who were under Binani’s command. That’s why Invisible Children and its partners will continue to use fliers, FM broadcasts and helicopter speaker messaging to inform LRA combatants of Binani’s death and direct them to safe surrender sites.

Invisible Children’s “come home” programs are possible because of the consistent generosity of TRI donors and everyone who has helped fund our life-saving projects.

Based on information gathered through the LRA Crisis Tracker and Invisible Children’s original research in the LRA-affected region, here’s what we know:

One of Kony’s top ten commanders, Lt. Colonel Binani was killed in combat this past Friday by Ugandan forces (UPDF) approximately 280 km north of Djemah, Central African Republic.

Binani  (sometimes spelled Binany)  is known for being a brutal commander who oversaw the deadly Makombo Massacre in late 2009; 321 people were killed and more than 250 abducted over the course of four days.

Vincent Binansio “Binani” Okumu was a young commander with a reputation for being loyal to Kony and willing to carry out brutal attacks on civilians and used violent means to control his subordinates. Like several other relatively young commanders such as Okot Odek, Otto Ladere, Ochan Nono Labongo, and Otim Ferry, Binani’s loyalty to Kony stems from his early service as one of Kony’s personal bodyguards. Estimated to be in his late twenties, Binani was the commander of all Congo-based LRA groups and directly oversaw operations in Garamba National Park.

In 2008 Kony gave Binani command of Central Brigade, a prestigious post responsible for Kony’s security. LRA escapees testified that he had significant responsibility for planning and executing the Makombo Massacres, a series of brutal attacks on civilians in northeastern Congo in which 321 civilians were killed and more than 250 abducted. In late 2011, the majority of LRA commanders in Congo were called to a ‘conference’ with Kony in CAR. During that time Binani remained in Congo, presumably tasked by Kony with safeguarding food and weapons caches throughout the park and maintaining a foothold for the LRA in Congo.

In late 2012, Binani was likely the commanding officer of about 50-60 fighters operating mostly in Congo’s Haut Uele district. He operated in and around the Garamba National Park complex, with his forces often attacking towns such as Faradje and Gangala Na Bodio. He reportedly moves with a small group of about 20 fighters but oversees two satellite groups led by Lt. Col. Okot ‘Odek’ and Major Obol ‘the one-eyed.’ Binani was also in charge of a group of 20 fighters under Brigadier Ochan Bunia. This group, which also includes Major Ochan Nono Labongo, has frequently moved between CAR and Congo.

UPDATE: Check out our more thorough analysis of what these developments means for the Lord’s Resistance Army, communities in central Africa, and Invisible Children.

There was a 42% drop in reported LRA attacks from Quarter 2 (Q2) to Q3 2012. This drop mirrors a similar reduction in attacks from Q2-Q3 in 2010 and 2011.

Most senior LRA commanders are thought to be operating out of southeastern and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR), as well as the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave on the border of Sudan and South Sudan that is currently controlled by Sudan.

There was an average of 0.18 people killed per LRA attacks in Q3 2012, continuing a trend observed over the past year of severely reduced killings by the LRA. The trend was particularly pronounced in Congo during Q3 2012, where LRA forces killed only 1 civilian in 39 attacks there.

94 people reportedly returned from the LRA during Q3 2012. Of these returnees, 28 reported being abducted for 72 hours or less, and 50 others reported being abducted for less
than one month. The LRA reportedly abducted 90 civilians in Q3 2012, a majority of which were adults.

The LRA Crisis Tracker is a real-time mapping platform and data collection system created to bring an unprecedented level of transparency to the atrocities of the LRA. Visit lracrisistracker.com or follow them on Twitter @CrisisTracker for up-to-date information about LRA activity.

Invisible Children staff are working at the forefront of the conflict with partners in the region to encourage the peaceful defection of LRA combatants, women, and children. Through messages received from a combination of FM radio programs and defection fliers,  individuals in the LRA are overcoming the fear instilled by top LRA leadership and, slowly but steadily, making the decision to come back home.

We were on site in Obo working with our partners at Radio Zereda the day that Francis came out, and it’s hard to imagine a more rewarding sight. He becomes one of 17 documented returnees to have come out in just the last month, after a prolonged period within the LRA’s ranks.

Despite frequent and often violent LRA attacks that continue in the region, a cautious yet palpable sense of optimism is emerging, through stories like Francis’. It has been a remarkable season for LRA defection already, and we remain hopeful that the best is yet to come.

Since last year, 470,000 have been mass produced to be distributed throughout DR Congo and the Central African Republic. How are they distributed, exactly? Great question. In addition to the fliers being placed on paths known to be used by LRA groups moving in the region, they are dropped from circling planes, sometimes a mere thousand feet above known LRA groups. Are you ready for a tutorial?

Returnees have credited the defection fliers with educating them that they can successfully escape. Most recently, one of Kony’s wives who escaped in February, said, “What encouraged me to leave was the flier I saw there. We saw the picture of people who had escaped. It was then the idea came to my mind. I will try to escape. Whatever Kony says, I will try to escape.”

The defection fliers work alongside our FM Radio project which uses radio broadcasting to reach LRA groups and encourage their surrender through “Come Home” messaging. In a recent study of former combatants who had escaped, 89% cited radio messaging as the main factor as to why they chose to escape. We are continuing to work with former escapees to build compelling messaging to target mid-level LRA combatants and women and children attached to the group so they know there is life after abduction; they can return home and leave a life of captivity.